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Landlords’ duties to protect tenants from crime: 
Valencia v Michaud, 2000 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Landlord has duty to take “minimally burdensome” steps to remove unauthorized guest 
from apartment building if guest’s behavior poses “slight likelihood” of violent crime on 
premises. 
Valencia v Michaud (2000) 79 CA4th 741, 94 CR2d 268 
Nine-year-old Bertha Valencia lived with her family in a 33-unit apartment building. Eric 
Umali was visiting his parents, who were tenants on the same floor of the building as the 
Valencias. Under the terms of his parents’ lease, Eric was an unauthorized guest because he had 
stayed on the premises more than three days without the landlords’ consent. Bertha’s mother 
complained four times to the apartment manager of Eric’s “strange behavior”: walking the halls 
day and night, giving her menacing looks, and trying to enter her locked apartment. Another 
tenant also complained about Eric’s disturbing behavior. Although the landlords’ policy was to 
ask unauthorized guests to leave the premises if they were creating a nuisance, and to call the 
police if they refused, the landlords did nothing to remove Eric.  
Two weeks after the fourth complaint, Eric seriously injured Bertha in a violent stabbing 
attack in the hallway of the building. Bertha and her family sued the landlords for (1) premises 
liability and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the landlords on both claims, finding, respectively, that (1) the attack was not 
reasonably foreseeable and (2) Bertha’s family did not witness the attack. 
The court of appeal reversed the trial court, holding that, pursuant to their duty to protect 
tenants from foreseeable third party criminal assaults, the landlords had a duty to take reasonable 
steps to remove Eric. The landlords had sufficient information about Eric’s behavior to make the 
attack foreseeable to a reasonably prudent landlord, even though Eric had not previously 
committed any violent acts on the premises. The proposed preventive measures (asking Eric to 
leave after he stayed longer than three days, or reporting Eric’s unlawful behavior to the police) 
were minimally burdensome. Because the attack could have been prevented by simple means, a 
lesser degree of foreseeability was required, under the rule of Ann M. v Pacific Plaza Shopping 
Ctr. (1993) 6 C4th 666, 679, 25 CR2d 137, reported in 17 CEB RPLR 137 (Feb. 1994). The 
court held (94 CR2d at 280): 
If the facts known to the landlords were sufficient to notify them of a slight likelihood that Eric 
would injure a resident, then they had a duty to take the minimally burdensome steps available to 
them to remove him from the premises. 
Accordingly, the court reversed the summary judgment on the premises liability issue and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
The court, however, affirmed the judgment against Bertha’s family on their claim of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress because they were not percipient witnesses to the attack. They 
were inside their apartment when the attack occurred and learned of it from a neighbor shortly 
afterward. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: The court’s approach presents an easy-to-follow menu of the steps 
plaintiff’s counsel must follow to make out a successful case of landlord premises liability, but 
the outcome (or the appropriate advice to give landlords worrying about future lawsuits) will be 
difficult to predict, because there are not going to be many general rules or guidelines; each 
result is going to turn entirely on its factual setting. 
The focus of the court’s analysis is an examination of what measures the landlord should have 
taken to protect the tenant (I’ll refer to it as the plaintiff’s “demand”): The more burdensome 
those measures are, the more foreseeable the harm is going to have to be, meaning that every 
possible reduction in those demands will improve the plaintiff’s case. Here, for instance, a 
demand that Eric be forced to move out is obviously far lighter than a demand that a full-time 
security guard be posted in the hall where he roams. That latter demand would surely require the 
landlord’s actual knowledge of Eric’s dangerous propensities, if not knowledge of prior similar 
acts by him. 
But while eviction seems like an easy demand in this particular case, that will not always be 
true. What if Eric’s sister moved out instead, reducing his family unit to the permitted size of 
three? Would the landlord have to evict Eric on the mere ground that he was not the named third 
tenant on the lease? Could the landlord turn down Eric’s application to replace his sister as a 
named tenant? Could the landlord require a criminal investigation of Eric’s character before 
admitting him because the plaintiff had complained about him? If Eric had been a lawful tenant 
at the time of his assault, would a demand to remove him be sufficiently more burdensome as to 
require actual knowledge of his violent nature?  
Each one of these variables suggests a different level of burden and therefore a different level 
of foreseeability, and I would not want to have to give legal advice to a landlord about how much 
effort to put into getting one tenant out when another tenant has complained about him. (Nor 
would I want to have to deal with the risk that I will be blamed for enraging the violent tenant all 
the more by attempting to evict him, thereby triggering the very assault that my client may have 
to pay for.) It might be cheaper to just find another apartment for Bertha’s family, but that would 
kill any foreseeability defense if Eric then attacks someone else instead.)  
This litigation strategy of lowering the demand for protection to get a compensating reduction 
in foreseeability will also generate other difficulties. In hindsight, removing Eric may have been 
all that was needed, but is that what Bertha’s relatives were demanding at the time? If their 
demands to the landlord were for, say, security guards or extra-strong doors, can they prevail in 
court by showing that the tenant’s removal would not have been expensive? Would Eric’s 
removal have been effective (or satisfied their demands) if he returned after having been expelled 
and was then able to assault Bertha because there were no security bars on the doors or security 
guards in the hall when he came back? If not, should the landlord have kept the property guarded 
constantly to ensure that Eric never came back (even to visit his own mother)? It seems to me, as 
a non-tort lawyer, that burdensomeness has to be measured from a pre-assault perspective, when 
we don’t know what kind of event may occur. Before the assault, could anyone have said that 
Eric’s removal was all that was needed?  
It’s true that the decision only means that Bertha gets to go to trial, where she may lose 
anyway. But a jury trial on such an issue is a lot more expensive than the summary judgment the 
landlord’s lawyer sought. It’s hard to count on a jury always separating hindsight from foresight. 
I am so glad that I do not have to do personal injury work.  
NOTE: There is now a case before the California Supreme Court on closely related issues. 
Saelzler v Advanced Group 400 (review granted Mar. 29, 2000, S085736; superseded opinion at 
77 CA4th 1001 (advance reports), 92 CR2d 103), reported in 23 CEB RPLR 102 (Mar. 2000). So 
we haven’t heard the last of this yet. —Roger Bernhardt 
 
